Winning without Fighting Chinese Legal Warfare

In contrast, Chinese writings propose a conception of legal warfare that would involve a range of activities aimed at taking the initiative on the battlefield of justice and public opinion and disrupting an adversary`s military activities. Such activities would include legal coercion and deterrence measures that would alert an adversary to a thorough investigation for possible violations of the law of armed conflict; lawful strikes that accuse the enemy of operational activities in violation of international and national laws; and legal counterattacks, which would highlight the enemy`s attempts to bow or distort international law, to contrast unfavorably with its own (legally), and to counter hostile legal activities. [25] Since Mao`s death, the CCP has made concerted efforts to create a body of law—a tacit admission that rule-by-decree governance is incompatible with the expansion and modernization of the Chinese economy. However, most of these new regulations focus on commercial and contract law; The legal structure of criminal and civil law remains weak and international law is practically non-existent. Moreover, the law remains an instrument that applies mainly to the “masses”, as opposed to the party. As a result, China is still subject to the rule of law, not the rule of law. To be as effective as possible, psychological and legal warfare requires the use of public opinion. Public opinion and legal warfare require psychological warfare so that their goals and methods can be refined. Public opinion and psychological warfare, in turn, are strengthened by the information obtained through legal warfare.

[1] Over the past decade, the People`s Republic of China has shown a growing interest in asymmetric warfare. To this end, the PRC issued a first set of rules on political warfare in December 2003 before it was updated in 2010. These “political labor regulations” for the People`s Liberation Army (PLA) deal with the importance of fighting “the three wars”: public opinion, psychological warfare and legal warfare. Chinese legal warfare measures would almost certainly be combined with psychological warfare and public/media warfare measures. China`s analysis of the second Iraq war suggests that the coalition`s ability to contact Iraqi commanders and warn them against the use of weapons of mass destruction is deeply troubling. It would not be surprising if the People`s Liberation Army attempted to wage comparable legal and psychological warfare against U.S. and allied commanders and deter them from engaging in military activities (e.g., attacks on key infrastructure or transport targets) that could be considered a violation of norms or laws. China`s victory theory is based on coercion by arming information. In particular, China`s concept of three wars – which uses psychological, media, and legal warfare – uses information operations to compete in the SCS and ultimately prevail.5 Psychological warfare is “the pre-war posture of military/paramilitary forces or.

other national capacities”, for example by using diplomatic, economic and cultural levers to “intimidate opponents and promote acquiescence”. 6 Media manipulation reinforces the Chinese narrative.7 Chinese lawfare uses legal frameworks to “restrict adversary behavior, challenge adverse circumstances, confound precedents, and maximize benefits.” 8 If this concept is not challenged, it will challenge international norms in the physical, cognitive and informational dimensions of the information environment. But once identified and understood, Chinese information operations can be successfully combated. China is actively engaging with SCS Lawfare as part of its information operations strategy. China declared its maritime claims “indisputable” and said the construction of artificial islands was “fair, reasonable and legal.” 19 Yet it ignores the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by incorrectly drawing straight baselines, impeding freedom of overflight, and restricting non-economic activities in claimed exclusive economic zones, even though it is a signatory to UNCLOS.20 A special arbitration tribunal of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that there was no legal or historical basis. China`s claim to a nine-dash Line. as well as other contentious issues. However, China “continues to delegitimize and ignore the decision,” declaring that it is “nothing more than a piece of paper.” 21 Following Sun Tzu`s saying “Win without going to war,” the Communist Party Central Committee and the CMC established the concept of the “Three Wars” (sanzhongzhanfa) as a set of codes for the PLA for political warfare.

The three war strategies called “Guidelines for the Political Work of the People`s Liberation Army” include: public opinion (media), war (yulunzhan), psychological warfare (xinlizhan) and legal warfare (faluzhan) with their accents; control of public opinion, psychological warfare, including blunting the determination of an opponent, transformation of emotions, psychological leadership, collapse of the organization (of an adversary), psychological defense; and statute of limitations (litigation). Why the Chinese media resort to such a tactic. To understand this, it is important to understand China`s “win without fight” war strategy. It is to the credit of the Chinese military that it has not relied on foreign militaries to define its own military doctrine, but that it has used its national knowledge and experience to design its strategy and doctrines according to national requirements. This gap is reinforced by the differences between the PRC and the United States.